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1. INTR9DUCTION
This article is a part of the research which mainly purports to
describe the exchange process mediated by prices. In th~ work of
Maruyama [9J, under the specification of the transaction rule in the
price-mediated exchange economy, we gave some equilibrium concept
(name ly the price-media ted exchange equilibrium). This definition
takes its rise in the modification of Morishima's characterization of
Walrasian exchange equilibrium, and assumes a natural constraint
imposed on each agent's transaction mediated by prices and is en-
dowed with the essential property of voluntary exchange. This
equilibrium concept is a general one, \:>ecause of the fact that it in-
cludes a Walrasian exchange equilibrium as its unique efficient state
and the several non-Walrasian equilibria(e.g. monopolistic equilibri-
urn and fixprice equilibrium) as its special states. We will attempt
to pose a unified approach to the explanation of several representa-
tive configurations of equilibria by imposing special restrictions on
the general structure of price-mediated exchange economy. At first,
in this article we will examine two limiting cases which extract the
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efficient state of the price-mediated exchange economy (i. e. the
Walrasian exchange equilibrium), hence, by doing so, we will" capture
the essential meanings of Walrasian exchange equilibrium.
The first limiting case we will consider here is the economy which
consists of a sufficiently large numder of agents and each agent's
volume of transaction is relatively so small that we can treat it as
a negligible one. Then we can show the limit theorem: the equili-
brium concept of a price-mediated exehange er.onomy coincides with
the Walrasian exchange equilibrium when the economy is in our limit-
ing case. Note that this limit theorem is prima facie giving the
same line of reasoning as the one of usual cooperative market ex-
change game model, but they are distinct from each other, because the
former explicitly presupposes the structure of exchange mediated
by prices. The limit theorem of the cooperative market exchange
model says that the core, which is difinitely Pareto efficient, shrinks
to Walrasian exchange equilibria as the number of agent approaches
infinity, however, our limit theorem says that the set of price-medi-
ated exchange equilibria, which are in general shown to be Pareto
inefficient, shrinks to the efficient state of it. This result may be
interpreted as follows: the general inefficient property of our equili-
bria originates from the essential nature of voluntary exchange me-
diated by prices, if the economy is large, hence, there are many
similar agents and each agent's volume of transaction IS negligibly
small, then the effect of each agent's selfish behaviour s inks under
the ocean and the efficient state can only be extracted as the price-
mediated exchange equilibrium.
The second limiting case we will examine In this article IS the ter-
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minal state of some assumed dynamic exchange process when time
goes to infinity. We will suppose that any transaction is actually
carried out only at the price-mediated exchange equilibria. After
the transaction, however, if the state is not a price-mediated exchange
equilibrium when viewed itself as an initial state, then we will sup-
pose that the assumed recontract mediated by prices is reiterated,
which generates some new price-mediated exchange equilibrium, the
allocation is altered, and this dynamic exchange process continues ad
infinitum. Then we will show that this sequence of allocations gener-
ated by the recurrence of price-mediated exchange game will con-
verge to the Walrasian exchange equilibrium. This result implies
that the recurrence of recontract may exhaust mutually advantageous
contracts and so extracts the efficient price-mediated exchange equi-
librium as its limiting case.
In the final section we will partially examine the movement of prices
which is associated with the sequence of price-mediated exchange
equilibria. It will be shown that the movement of prices directed by
actual market participants a posteriori obeys the Law of Supply
and Demand. The present state of the research area concerning
to the price-adjustment from the market-wide perspective lacks a
systematic explanation, hence, our result may serve as one possible
clue to it.
2. Preliminary Remarks
Let 0= I( Xi> Ui , WiLE/, J I denote an exchange economy with a finite
set of agents I= I i I i= 1,2, ... , nl and a set of commodities J = 1 j I j
= 1,2, ... , mi. XiCR m denotes agent i's feasible consumption set,
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Ui denotes his utility function, and Wi denotes his initial endowment
of commodities. Concerning to the characteristics of each agent we
assume the following: for any agent i E I
Assumptio'TI: 1: feasible consumption set Xi = non-negative orth-
ant of m-dimensional Euclidean space R":,
Assumption 2: initial endowment vector Wi is positive,
Assumption 3: utility function U i is strictly quasi-concave, mono-
tone increasing and continuously differentiable, and
Assumption 4: !XiEXi I UJxJ~ UJwJI n aR":= ¢
,where. oR"; denotes the boundary of R"/.
Now we will define the structure of exchange and the solution con-
cept of the price-media ted exchange economy.
Definition 1: We will say that a coalition C can p-block the
allocation (Xi) iEI from the initial allocation (wJ iEI is there exists a
pair of price vector P and the allocation(p,(xJiEc), such that
[i] I;iECXi= I; iECWi,
[ii] (ViEC): (I;jPjXij=I;jpjWij),
[iii] (V. iE C): (UJxJ~ UJxJ) and (:3 iE C): (UJxJ> UJxJ), and
[iv] (V i E C) : ( ] tE [0, 1]) : ( Ui( xJ t)) > UJ xJ),
where Xi denotes agent i's consumption vector, Xij and Wij denote
his consumption and initial endowment of commodity j, respectively,
and Xi( t)= Wi+ t(Xi- wJ.
This definition differs from the usual one of cooperative market
game in two points, condition [iiJ and [iv]: In the price-mediated
exchange economy any agent is naturally supposed to trade subject
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to his budget constraint and in the voluntary exchange economy it is
natural to suppose that nobody can be forced to trade beyond he
wishes. In the following, when we consider two commodity exchange
economy, we often use one special transaction rule(proportional ra-
tioning ,scheme).
Definition 2: We say that a coalition C allocates its initial allo-
cation (we! iEC among members according to a proportional ration-
ing scheme at the price vector p; if the allocation (xJ iE c is gi ven
as follows:
Xi = Zi(P) + Wi
Xi = OZi(P) + Wi
for any agent iE S(p)
for any agent i E L(p),
where Zi(P) denotes agent i's Walras ian net trade vector ~ t p, that
is, Zi(P) = (z,,(p), z,,(p)), S(p) denotes the set of agents who belong
to the short s ide of markets at p, which IS defined as S (p)
=liEC[z"L:iECZ,,;£;O!, L(p) denotes the set of agents who belong
to the long side of markets at p, which is defined as L(p)
= liE C IZ"L:iE cZ" > 0 f, and 0 is a ra tioning coefficient of both mar-
kets, which is defined as 0= -L:iESZil/L:iE/.Z".
It can be easily seen that. the allocation (iJiEC satisfies conditions
[i], [ii] and [iv] In Definition 1, if (XJiEC IS given by the
special transaction rule specified above. Hence we will define the
special concept of p-block ing in the following manner.
Definition 3: We will say that under a special transaction rule
a c'oalition C can p-block the allocation (XJiEI from the initial allo-
cation (Wi)iEI is there exists a pair of price vector and the alloc-
ation (P,(XJiEC) such that
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[i] (.il)lEC is given by the transaction rule in Definition 2, and
[ii] (\:jiEC):(UJ.i,)~UJxJ)and(:JiEC):(UJ.iJ>Ui(xJ).
With this concept of p-blocking we define the foJlowing concept.
Definition 4: We say the aJlocation (XJiEI is p-Pareto optimal,
when it is feasible, that is, L:iE1Xi=L:iEIWi and XiEXi for any agent
i and it is not p-blocked by any coalition which consists ·of the
whole of agents. Furthermore if the aJlocation is feasible and it is
not p-blocked by any coalition we say that this aJlocation belongs
to the p-core.
Now we wiJ] restate the equilibrium concept in the price-mediated
exchange economy, which was employed in Maruyama [9]. Our concept
of equilibrium is directly related to the characterization of Walrasian
exchange equilibrium given by Morishima [ 10]: the allocation (Xi) iE I is
a Walrasian exchange equilibrium one relative to the initial allocation
(W;)iEI if and only if it is Pareto optimal and the conditions
[a] (:J P~ 0): (\:j iE n: (L:JPJXiJ =L:JPJWiJ), and
[ b] (\:j i E I) : ( lJ t E [ 0, 1 ]) : ( Ui( Xi (t) ) > Ui(xJ )
are satisfied, where Xi( t) = Wi + t(Xi - wJ. The condition [a] is a
fundamental constraint which is imposed on each agent's transaction
in the price-mediated exchange economy, and the condition [b] pre-
sents the essential property of voluntary exchange. But, the concept
of Pareto optimality is defined independently from the fact that ex-
change is mediated by prices. We are now explicitly considering the
exchange mediated by prices, hence we wiJl employ the concept of
p-Pareto optimality in place of the Pareto optimality in the usual
sense.
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Definition 5: We say the pair of price vector and the allocation
(p, (xJ 'EI) a price-mediated exchange equilibrium (abbreviated as
p. e. e.) relative to the initial allocation (W')'EI when it is p-
Pareto optimal and the above two conditions [a J and [b J are satis-
fied. Furthermore we say (P,(X.)'EI) a strong price-mediated.
exchange equilibrium (abbreviated as strong p. e. e.) relative to
(Wi )iEI when 'it is p-core and the above two conditions [a J and [b J
are satisfied.
Here will give some remarks on the p. e. e.
Remark 1: From the definition of p. e. e. we can directly derive the
statement that the pair of price vector and the allocation (P,(X;)iEI)
is a Walrasian exchange equilibrium if and only if it is a p. e. e. and
the aliocation(x,LEI is Pareto optimal in the usual sense. As a corol-
lary of this result we can state that any p. e. e. a'llocation except
for Walrasian exchange equilibrium one (namely any non-trivial p. e.
e. allocation) is not Pareto optimal in the usual sense.
Remark 2: If the initial allcation is positive and is not Pareto
optimal, then it is not a p. e. e. allocation at all.
This remark can be easily justified as follows. First we note the
fact that if the initial allocation IS positive, then the existence of
Walrasian exchange equilibrium is assured under our Assumptions,
and Walrasian exchange equilibrium is a p. e. e. and its allocation is
Pareto optimal. Then, it is clear that if the initial allocation is not
Pareto optimal, it is not a p-Pareto optimal allocation, hence, is
not a p. e. e. allocation.
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3. On the Two Limiting Cases
We have already given the characterization of p. e. e. and explor-
ed the clo se relation between p. e. e., Walrasian exchange equilibr-
IUm and non-Walrasian equilibrium in [9]. Hereafter we will focus
our attention on Remark 1: Walrasian exchange equilibrium is the
unique efficient p. e. e. That is, in this section we will examine two
limiting cases which extract the efficient state of the price-mediated
exchange economy( i. e. the Walrasian exchange equilibrium). Hence,
by doing so, we will capture the essential meaning of Walrasian ex-
change equilibrium. A representative approach of Debreu· and Scarf
[3J characterized a Walrasian exchange equilibrium as a limiting
case of the solution of cooperative market exchange game(i. e. the
core), where economy consists of a sufficiently large number of
agents. That is, they showed the limit theorem: as the number of
agents approaches infinity, the core allocation coincides with the one
of Walrasian exchange equilibrium. There are various interpretations
about this limit theorem. In my view, the solution concepts of the
coopera tive ma rket exchange game (i. e. the core) is defined inde-
pendently from the fact that exchange is media ted by prices. However,
Walrasian exchange equilibrium is nothing but a equilibrium co.ncept
of the price-mediated exchange economy. In other words, Walrasian
exchange equilibrium, in its definition, prespposes a special struc-
ture of exchange: price-mediated exchange. The concept of the core
in the usual cooperative market exchange game and the Walrasian
exchange equilibrium presuppose virtually different structures of ex-
change, respectively. In the following we will explore ,the limit theo-
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rem m the price-mediated exchange economy. Here we will focus
our attention on the strong p. e. e. which is given in Definition 5.
By strengthening the equilibrium concept in this way can we directly
extract the efficient state of the price-mediated exchange economy?
Consider a two commodity-two agent exchange economy. Then in this
economy we can easily show that p. e. e. is equivalent to strong p.
e. e. and so that non- trivial strong p. e. e. is not Pareto optimal m
the usual sense. Hence, in general, we can say that strong p. e. e.
does not necessarily coincide with the Walrasian exchange equilibr-
!Urn.
Here we will examme the property of strong p. e. e. in the limit-
ing case where the economy consists of a s~fficiently large number
of agents. We can derive the following result in the two commodity
exchange economy, where any coalition uses the special <transaction
rule specified in Definition 2.
Proposition 1: In a sufficiently large r-fold replica economy,
the strong p. e. e. allocation coincides with the Walrasian exchange
equilibrium one.
Proof: We will show this by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose the
r-fold replica economy Iff r: there are n types of agents, with r
agents of each type and every agent of the same type has precisely
the same preference and the same endowment. Let (p, xl be the pair
of strong p. e. e. price vector and allocation of the sufficiently
large r- fold replica economy. Suppose that it IS not the pair of
Walrasian exchange equilibrium. Then from Remark 1 the allocation
X is not' Pareto optimal. Now for any chosen type i of agents who
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belong to the short side of markets at p we can take some price
vector p such that p is sufficiently close to p and UJ zJp) + wtl
> Ui(zJp) + wJ for any agent of type i. If we choose any type k
of agents who belong to the long side of markets at 15, then from the
fact that Uk(Zk(p) + Wk) > Uk(Xk) and the continuity of Zk(P) and his
utility function it is clear that Uk(Zk(P) + Wk) > Uk(Xk) for any agent
of type k. Here we must note that an allocation of strong p. e. e.
assigns the same consumption to all agents of the same type in our
specified exchange economy.
Now we suppose the sequence of integer ri such that it approaches
infinity. We define rk( rJ as the minimum integer rk which satisfies
the relation ri IZil(P) I ~ rk IZkJ (p) I. Suppose the coalition which
consists of ri agents of type i and rk( rJ agent of type k. If this
coalition makes a transaction specified in Definition 2 at the price
p, the resulting consumption vector of each agent IS:
Xi = zkp) + Wi for any agent of type
xk = o( rtl Zk(P) +Wk for any agent of type k,
where o( ri) is a rationing coefficient of both markets, which can be
given as o( rtl = ri IZil (p) I / rk IZkl (p) I by inspecting the construction
of the coalition. From the definition of rk( Ttl it can be justified that
limTi~=o(rtl=1. Then it is clear that this coalition p-blocks the
allocation x when the economy is sufficiently large r-fold replica
economy. This contradicts the supposition that (15, x) is a pair of
strong p. e. e. This completes the proof. II
This result implies that, when we presuppose a price-mediated ex-
change economy, and formulate it in a cooperative game manner, then
the limiting case of equilibrium coincides with Walra!iian exchange
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equilibrium, where there IS a sufficiently large number of agents. And
note that our approach here is different from the limit theorem of
the usual cooperative market exchange game model in the point: pre-
supposition of the structure of exchange (price-media ted exchange).
Recently, many authors focus their attention on the structure of
price-mediated exchange and formulate it in a non-cooperative game
manner. (See Schmeidler [13J, Shapley [14J, Shapley and Shubik [15],
Roberts and Postle\,,:aite [12], and works in [11J). Roberts and
Postlewaite also explicitl y assume that exchange is guided by prices,
then they show that under some assumptions the incentive to manip-
ulate prices will disappear in a large economy. Maruyama [8J
formulates the price-mediated exchange economy in a non-co?perative
game manner and shows that equilibrium in this economy coincides
with Walrasian exchange equilibrium when the economy consists of
a large number of agents. In combining this result with the above
result we may be able to support the usual interpretation of Walras-
ian exchange equilibrium in the price-media ted exchange economy.
Next we will examine the alternative limiting case of p. e. e. That
is, we will examine the limiting case of some dynamic process of ex-
change when time goes to infinity. Now we will examine the limit of
sequence generated by the following hypothetical exchange process.
At first we suppose that any exchange is actually carried out only
at the price-mediated exchange equilibrium. That is, by noting the
property that any p. e. e. allocation is p-Pareto optimal, this sup-
,
position implicitly assumes that recontracting process mediated by
prices (information-exchange process where price plays the role of
essential means of communication) exhausts any mutually advantageous
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trading contract as possible and only after _that any exchange is ac-
tually carried out. In this article we will not precisely define this
recontracting process mediated by prices, rather we simply assume
some recontracting process such that if there is a room of recon-
trac t, then it is done and ultimately it generates some p. e. e. as its
stable point (the precise definition of recontract mediated by
prices is given in Maruyama [7J).
For any given initial allocation, some p. e. e. allocation IS gener-
ated by this assumed recontracting process and then the transition
of initial allocation to this p. e. e. allocation is undertaken. Here we
must note the fact that under our Assumption 4 any p. e. e. alloca-
tion must belong to the interior of non-negative orthant. Hence, if
this p. e. e. allocation is not Pareto optimal, then by noting Remark
2, it is not a p. e. e. allocation when viewed itself as a initial allo-
cation, therefore, the assumed recontract is reiterated at this new
initial allocation. This recurrence of recontract mediated by prices
generates the sequence of p. e. e. allocation 1w( t) f;"~l' which satisfies
the relation:
w( t + 1) E P *(w ( t) ) CPu ( w( t) ),
where w( t) denotes the allocation at time t, P *( w( t)) denotes the
set of p. e. e. allocation relative to w( t), and the set pur w( t)) = 1w
=(W,LEIIU,(w,)~ U,(w,(t)) and w,EX, for any agent i, and LiE/Wi
= L iEI Wi( t) l-
In the following we will examine the limit of sequence of p. e. e.
alloca tion. We note the Pareto improving property of the sequence.
Then we can show the following result.
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Proposition 2: The sequence of p. e. e. allocation I w( t) };"~1 con-
verges to a Pareto optimal allocation.
Proof: The sequence I w( t) 1;"=1 has a convergent subsequence,
because the set Pu ( w) is compact. So we choose the convergent
subsequence j w (tv) IVEQ such that lim w( tv) = w( (0), where Q is an
vEQ
infinite set of positive integers. Let U( w) = (Ui ( w,)) iE[, where Ui is
consumer i's utility function. Then from the definition of the p. e. e.
and the dynamic process it follows that (V t) : ( U( w( t+ 1)) ~ U( w
( t))). That is, the sequence I U( w( t)) f;:, which corresponds to the
sequence j w( t) f;:, is monotone increasing on the compact set, hence
this sequence converges. Let lim U( w( t)) = U. From the continuity
,~OO
of the utility fuction we have lim U( w( tv)) = U( lim w( tv)) = U( w( 00 )).
VEQ VEQ
Here we have U( w( 00)) = U because of the fact that the convergent
sequence IU( w( t)) I;"~I must have unique limit. Now we choose another
subsequence I w( tv + 1) f VEQ. Because this is a sequence in the com-
pact set, we have a subsequence j w( tv+ 1) IVEQ, such that lim w( tv + 1)
VEQl
= w( 00 + 1), where Ql C Q. By the similar argument we have U( w
(oo+l))=U.Hence it follows that U(w(oo))=U(w(OO+l)). By
noting the fact that the infinite subsequence I w( tv) IVEQ, of the con-
vergent sequence! w( tv) i vEQ must be convergent, we have ! w( tv) f VEQ"
limw( tv) = w( 00), I w( tv + 1) IVEQ" lim w( tv + 1) = w( 00 + 1), and (Vv)
VEQl VEQI
: (w( tv + 1) E Pu( w( tv)). Then from the upper semi-continuity of
Pu(w), we have w(oo+l)EP,,(w(oo)). Now suppose that w(ooJ is
not Pareto optimal. Then from Remark 2 w( (0) is not a p. e. e. al-
location. From the definition of the dynamic process we have w( 00)
=\= w( 00 + 1). This result implies that U( w( 00 + 1)) 2: U( w( (0)), which
contradicts the above result: U( w( 00 + 1)) = U( w( 00 )). Hence w( 00 )
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must be a Pareto optimal allocation. This result implies that limit
points of the sequence 1w( t) fr~l are Pareto optimal.
Furthermore we can show that the sequence I w( t) !r~l converges
to a Pareto optimal allocation. This can be done by showing the
uniqueness of the limit point. We will show this by reductio ad ab-
surdum. Let· I w( tv) f VEO and I w( tv) IVEQ be subsequences of 1w( t) f r~ 1
converging, respectively, to wand w. Then from the above argument
we have U( w) = U( w). Now suppose that w=\= w. Then by noting the
strict quasi-concavity of Ui . it follows that this supposition cotra-
dicts the already shown result that both of limit points wand ware
Pareto optimal. Hence we verified that the limit point was unique and
so that the sequence of allocations I w( t) Ir~l converged to a Pareto
optimal allocation. This completes the proof. II
Considering the sequence of strong p. e. e. allocation, \ve may
have a same result. The strong p. e. e. is a p-core, hence, the
exchange process defined above can be interpreted as the recurrence
of price-mediated exchange game. This line of analysis of the ex-
change process may accord with the approach suggested by Laroque
[6J, and is related to recent works by Schoumaker [16J and Tulkens
and Zamir[17J in the literature of planning procedure (designing the
mechanism of resouce allocation processes).
4. On the Movement of Prices
From the recurrence of recontract mediated by prices IS derived
the sequence of price-mediated exchange equilibria. In this section
we will examine the property of the associated sequence of p. e. e.
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price vectors, that is, the price vector at which any transaction is
carried out. Can we say anything about the movement of prices? As
a clue to this examination we begin with a simplified example. Con-
sider a pure exchange economy with two agents indexed i and k,
and two commodities indexed 1 and 2. The recurrence of recontract
mediated by prices can be illustrated as follows by using a usual
Edgeworth's box-diagram. We denote Oi as the agent i's origin and
Ok as the agent k's origin. The horizontal axis measures the quan-
tity of commodity 1 and the vertical axis measures the quantity of
commodity 2.
We denote (p*( t), w*( t)) as a pair of p. e. e. price vector and al-
location at time t. Suppose that p.e. e. allocation at time t-1 is il-
lustrated as a point w *( t-1) in our diagram, then, by noting the
Definition of price-mediated exchange equilibrium, p. e. e. allocation at
time t must be sud a point w*(t) that is shown in our diagram. In
this case w*(t) is not Pareto optimal, where L and I~ are agent i's
and agent k's indifference curves, respectively. Hence, from Re-
mark 1, w*(t) is not a p. e. e. when viewed itself as a initial alloca-
tion. Consequently, after the transaction at time t some assumed
recontract is re-opened, and next p. e. e. allocation, i. e., p. e. e. allo-
cation at time t+1 will be generated. Here, p. e. e. allocation w*(t+1)
must be Pareto superior to the initial allocation w*( t), hence, p. e.e.
allocation at time t + 1 must be such a point w *( t + 1) which belongs
to the mutually advantageous shaded area. Therefore p. e. e. price
vector at time t + 1 must be illustrated as p *( t + 1) in our diagram.
This is a sketch of the sequence of p. e. e. genera ted by the recur-
rence of recontract in a simplified exchange economy.
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Here we pay attention to the movement of p. e. e. price vectors.
Note that there is a excess demand of commodity 1 and a excess
supply of commodity 2 at the price vector p*{t). Then this example
shows that the movement of p. e. e. price v~ctor from p*(t) to p*(t+
1) obeys the Law of Supply and Demand. This may be an interest-
ing feature of our exchange process mdia ted by prices. In the fol-
lowing we will formulate this intuition by restricting our analysis to
the case: two commodity exchange economy, where any coalitional
transaction is specified by the one given in Definition 2. We will
show the following proposition.
commodity 2
Okl~t----------------------+c:...::
w*(t-l)
L
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Proposition 3: The sequence of p. e. e. price vectors lp*(t) 1~~1 in
the above specified economy obeys the Law of Supply and Demand.
Proof: Let (p*(tl, (zt(t))iEI) denote the pair of p. e. e. price vec-
tor and the list of net trade vectors at time t. When we denote (Wi
(t) LEI as the initial allocation at time t ahd x*( tl = (X*(t))iEI as the
p. e. e. allocation at time t, z t( t) = xt - wJ tl for any agent t. We
say the movement of p. e. e. price .vector obeys the Law of Supply
and Demand, if the following condition holds: (L) (p~( t+ 1) - pJ( t) )
EiEIZij(P*( t)) > 0 for any commodity j, where Zij(P*( i)) denotes
agent i's Walrasian net trade of commodity j at the price vector
p*( tl. We are considering now two commodity exchange economy,
hence if we normalize the price vector as p*= (p,*,l), then the
above condition (L) coincides with the condition
p*( t +1) EiEI ZiCp *( tl) > O.
We will show that this condition will be satisfied.
. Here we choose any agent i E S (p*(t)), that is, the agent who be-
longs to the short side of markets at the price vector p*( t). See
Definition 2 and note the Pareto improving property of the sequence
of p. e. e. allocation, then p*(t)zt(t+l)~O for any agent iE S(p*
(tll. Hence we have EiEsp*(tlz7(t+l )~O. Now we have EiELp*(t)
z7(t+l);£,O because of the fact that EiEIZ7(t+l)=o, where L de-
notes the set of agents who belong to the long side of markets at
p*( t). Now \ye can show that for any agent i who belongs to the
long s ide of markets at p*( t)
p*( t+ 1 )iJp*( tl) > o.
We will show this by reductio ad absurdum. At first it can be easily
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seen that the sign of p*(t+1)zi(p*(tJ) is same and is not zero for
any agent i E L(p*( t)). We must note this fact. Hence we suppose
that p*(t+1)zi(p*(t))<O for any agent iEL(p*(t)). This implies
that p*U+l)zJp*(tJ)<P*U+l)Zi(p*U+l))=O. Then, from the
weak axiom of revealed preference we have p *( tl Zi(p *( t+ 1 )) > 0 for
any agent iE L(p*( t)). In our specified exchange economy this im-
plies that p*U)zi*U+1»O for any agent iEL(p*(tJ). Hence we
have LiELp*([)zf(t+1»O. This is a contradiction.
In our specified exchange economy note that the following condi-
tion holds:LiElzJp*( tJ) = (l - 012:~iEI. iJp*( t)), where 0 is a same
rationing coefficient in the both markets, i.e., O=-LiESZil(p*(tJ)j
LiEI.Zil(p*(t)) and 0 < 0<1. Accordingly we have p*(t+1 )LiEIZJp*
(tl) > O. This completes the proof. II
The theory of price adjustment has been domina ted by the idea
that prices rise iri the presence of excess demand and fall in the
presence of excess supply, namely, the Law of Supply and Demand
which crystallized the empirical fact. However, Arrow [lJ and
Koopmans [5J have already warned us against this treatment of
the problem and posed several scandals surrounding the usual
explanation. That is, the crucial property of the usual inter-
pretation of the Law of Supply and Demand IS that variations in
prices are generated by the working of the impersonal force of the
market and therefore, separated from the activities of the individual
market participants. Comparing the fact that demand and supply
functions are formula ted in accordance with the individuals' rational
maximizing behaviours, the mechanics of price change reflects no
one's rational maximizing behaviour. In other words, whose beh-
- 86 -
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aVlOur IS thereby expressed? And how is that behaviour motivated?
Each individual market participant is supposed to take prices as
given and determines his choices as to purchases and sales accord-
ingly; there is no one left over whose job it is to make a decision
on price. This fact speaks eloquently of ad hoc characteristics of
the usual explanation of the price adjustment. In reply to this cri-
tique Barro [2J and Iwai [4J gave choice- theoretic reasonings for
the Law of Supply and Demand by considering the optimal price ad-
justment rule of the monopolistic firm. The result of this section
may be viewed as a clue to explaining the price adjustment from the
market-wide perspective.
*This research was partly finacially supported by the Japan Society for the
Promotion of Science and the Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
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